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ALAIN BADIOU’S PASOLINI
The Problem of Subtractive Universalism
Bruno Besana
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The theme of a Pasolinian ‘beyond Europe’, at the origin of the project 
from which this volume starts, seems to appear, in Pasolini’s work, via 
two different, although inseparable, lines of inquiry. On the one hand, 
that which is ‘beyond Europe’ evokes a generic, ahistorical humanity, 
an always-already lost world of muthos, of which the poet follows the 
traces and the acts of reappearance within Europe, outside of it, and at 
its borders – from the portrait of ancestral reminiscences in modern 
India to the emergence of Rome’s ‘borgatari’ through the thickness of 
the consumerist modern metropolis, passing by way of Medea’s declin-
ing universe at the gates of Europe. But, on the other hand, if there is an 
evident risk of idealizing and indeed substantializing such an ahistorical, 
generic humanity, this humanity always appears to be inseparable from 
singular moments of fracture and transformation. This can be seen not 
only in the prophecy of the radical destructive force of Alì dagli occhi 
azzurri, but especially in the intricate form of Appunti per una Oresti-
ade africana. This film en suspens – a documentary which mixes theo-
retical and visual notes for a film to come, and which ultimately 
becomes a fictional film of its own – re-stages in Africa the Oresteia, the 
archetypical tale of the foundation of a society organized around rea-
son, order, and individual responsibility. By doing so, the African conti-
nent is both subtracted – in a very problematic move – from historical 
time and portrayed as the place from which a new foundation of history 
is possible. But what is at stake in this film is the possibility of under-
standing that which is ‘beyond Europe’ not as a mythical and static 
reality, but rather as the appearance of a moment of creative and 
destructive interruption, as is suggested not only by the socio-political 
inquiry that Pasolini attempts in the film, but also and especially by his 
use of free-form jazz, in which a new formal strategy appears that is 
inseparable from the introduction of noise and from the destruction of 
codified musical forms. 
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 In this and in other examples, that which is ‘beyond Europe’ 
appears as a mythical dimension, as the constant return of an ahistori-
cal ‘forza del passato’, producing the possibility of radical change in the 
present. In order to understand this, I propose to read the idea of such 
an (internal or external) ‘beyond Europe’, the idea of a change pro-
duced by the return of an ahistorical ‘forza del passato’,1 together with 
Pasolini’s script concering Paul, in which change appears rather as 
something radically new. More specifically, change appears in it, as we 
will see, as something that has no dialectical relation with the present, 
as something that emerges in the present, against the present, but dis-
jointed from it. If the script about Paul has something in common with 
the theme of a ‘beyond Europe’ from which a ‘forza del passato’ 
emerges, it derives, I think, from the fact that, in both cases, change 
appears as something that acts in the present via the absence of relation, 
as an ab-solute interruption. Change appears as something ‘inactual’, 
something which is in actuality, but disjointed from it; it appears as an 
unspeakable or mute fracture, something which is inconsistent with the 
very laws of enunciation on the basis of which the present narrates 
itself.
 In the following analysis, I wish to show how Alain Badiou’s work 
is crucial to understanding the exact sense of change as ‘inactuality’ or 
paradoxical actuality, and I wish to do so by scrutinizing his references 
to Pasolini. Badiou in fact investigates the concept of change through 
Pasolini’s depiction of the figure of Paul, arguing that it exposes a spe-
cific tension between universality and singularity, and between eternity 
and novelty, which constitutes the very dialectic of change. 
 Pasolini transposes the travels of Paul – the ‘founder’ of ‘European 
Christianity’ – into the twentieth century. More precisely – via a system 
of analogies according to which Jerusalem becomes Paris, Rome 
becomes New York, and Athens becomes Rome2 – Paul’s action is 
located in the time-span between the occupation of Europe by the Nazis 
and the first years after the Liberation. Through Paul, who at once is 
led into the very core of Europe and wanders at its ideal or geographical 
margins – from Damascus to New York – Pasolini interrogates at the 
same time the trajectory of Christianity and that of communism as two 
universalistic projects, which bring about something novel that 
addresses everyone.
 Badiou in particular focuses on three aspects of Pasolini’s reading 
of Paul: the fact that his universalistic project is built by destructive 
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means, through the undoing of the very divisions that govern the logic 
upon which the present is structured; the fact that Paul’s universalism 
appears to be very poor in content, almost voided or empty of facts or 
doctrinal basis; and the fact that Paul appears to be traversed by an 
internal split – a split between the Paul who announces Grace, which is 
given freely and concerns everyone, and the Paul of the Church, the 
founder of a closed and hierarchical structure. The radical change pro-
duced by Paul’s universalistic project is thus depicted in terms of a dou-
ble dialectic: on the one hand, a movement of embrace, of inclusion, 
which is almost devoid of content and realized by destructive means, 
and, on the other, the construction of a new community that turns 
immediately into a church, thus producing new hierarchies, divisions, 
and exclusions. In other words, there is a dialectic between a form of 
‘subtractive universalism’, in which change can address everyone as 
long as it is nothing but a fracture, and a dividing ecclesia, or (I will 
later justify this expression through Pasolini’s script about Paul) a ‘dia-
bolical church’.
 Only via the analysis of such intricate universalism can some light 
be shed on Pasolini’s idea of change as that which is twice inactual, at 
once the return of a non-historical ‘force of the past’ and the emergence 
of a radical novelty. 
1 .  S U B T R A C T I V E  U N I V E R S A L I S M
In a widely discussed philosophical text, Alain Badiou interprets, 
through the figure of Paul, the relationship among the concepts of uni-
versality, event, subject, and militancy.3 In this book, the script for Paso-
lini’s project of a contemporary filmic transposition of Paul’s life consti-
tutes a fundamental axis of inquiry. What Paul does, in Badiou’s per-
spective, is to announce an event. An event, for Badiou, is neither one 
fact among others, nor is it simply a very remarkable fact. Rather, it is a 
fracture introduced into the present – a fracture that, on the one hand, 
exposes the contingency of the laws organizing any given present situa-
tion and, on the other, exposes a truth that, because it is addressed to 
everyone, has a universal extension. Badiou gives, as an archetype of 
this structure, the example of a declaration of equality that is not 
founded on any objective ground (since equality cannot be positively 
proved), but instead interrupts a given mode of organization of inequal-
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ity (of the unequal roles that different subjects have in a given situa-
tion), showing that such inequality is in no way a natural condition, but 
the result of contingent relations of forces. At the same time, equality 
has a ‘universal address’:4 equality is in fact equality only if it concerns 
everyone, if it addresses everyone.5 These two characteristics of the 
event (appearance in the form of a radical fracture and universal 
address) can also be found in Paul’s predication, in which an event, the 
resurrection of Christ, is announced. First, Paul presents the resurrec-
tion as a ‘pure event, opening of an epoch, transformation of the rela-
tions between the possible and the impossible’6 – in other words, as a 
‘pure beginning’7 that divides history into two. Secondly, Paul insists on 
the fact that the resurrection of Christ implies that the possibility of 
defeating death is given potentially to everyone, i.e., regardless of any 
positive criteria (such as belonging to a given community), even regard-
less of any criteria of compensation for the acts accomplished. For Paul, 
a supplement of grace is posited for all, thus constituting a fracture with 
the previous law, with Moses’ law. 
 First, ‘Paul’s revolutionary kernel’, Badiou states, is that ‘the One 
(of monotheism)’ is ‘for all’.8 As such, it is not addressed to any specific 
particularity: ‘no evental One can be the One of a particularity. The 
universal is the only possible correlate for the One.’9 The grace of the 
One is such if it is addressed to all. Secondly, such grace is something 
structurally outside of law: as Badiou puts it, it is ‘an event’, and the 
truth exposed by it 
is always nondenumerable, impredicable, uncontrollable. This is precisely 
what Paul calls ‘grace’: that which occurs without being couched in any 
predicate, that which is translegal, that which happens to everyone with-
out an assignable reason. Grace is the opposite of law insofar as it is what 
comes without being due.10 
In fact, the salvation offered by the death and resurrection of Christ is 
out of reach of the law in two ways: it operates regardless of the eternal 
death to which we are condemned, in retribution for our original sin 
(which has the force of law), and it is also indifferent to (or out of pro-
portion to) the law (in the sense of the Mosaic law), which determines 
our salvation or damnation according to those acts by which we con-
firm or overcome our sin. This is the core of the doctrine that will be 
later called of ‘justification by grace alone’, in whose name Paul claims, 
in the Letter to the Romans, that ‘a man is justified by faith apart from 
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works of law’.11 Faith alone saves, but is there no measure for the con-
tent of faith (by definition, that in which one has faith is not an object 
of proof), nor does faith come with the possibility of measuring which 
extension or intensity suffices to obtain salvation.
 This has a dramatic consequence: for Badiou, the doctrine of justi-
fication is fundamentally a profound doctrine of equality, as Müntzer 
and the Anabaptists saw.12 Salvation is given regardless of all substan-
tive or even factual differences among humans;13 moreover, it is ‘for all’ 
(it addresses everyone, although not each one will be saved) precisely 
because, as it is in excess over all determinations, it cannot be connected 
to any specific fact or cause.14 It is because it has no positive ground 
that grace is for all, that it adresses each one potentially: as Badiou puts 
it, ‘there is for Paul an essential link between the “for all” of the univer-
sal and the “without cause”. There is an address for all, only according 
to that which is without cause. Only what is absolutely gratuitous can 
be addressed to all.’15 Equality appears to be connected with something 
excessive, lacking predicable content, which appears as a fracture and 
addresses all inasmuch as it has no positive, measurable content. 
 By announcing such an event, which concerns everyone equally, 
Paul appears, according to Badiou, as the paradigm of the subject. A 
subject, for Badiou, is neither a transcendental condition of possibility 
of experience, nor a specific object of the world, a res, such as (for 
instance) a specific living being provided with cognitive faculties. 
Instead, a subject is a function that inscribes an event, a fracture, an 
inconsistency, in the world. It is the function through which the univer-
sal address of the event is realized.16 Such a ‘faithful subject’, as Badiou 
calls it, ‘is the local status of a procedure, a configuration that exceeds 
the situation’.17 Anywhere such a subject appears, it represents the 
emergence of an absolutely singular moment, which is nonetheless 
strictly connected with – and even inseparable from – the unfolding of 
something of the order of the universal. Paul is thus a ‘subject’ because 
his actions are directed toward inscribing an excess into a situation, 
toward unfolding the consequences of the ‘illegality’ of grace. Further-
more, the universalism of his preaching (the idea that the grace is for 
all) is immediately and absolutely singular, for it is outside of law (since 
grace exceeds the logic of retribution of good and evil acts), thus 
appearing, in each contingent, historical situation in which he preaches, 
not as a logical element of that situation, but as an a-normal, absolutely 
singular one. 
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 Starting out from these considerations, Badiou observes that Paso-
lini’s idea of Paul as our contemporary is not simply a cinematographic 
gimmick. Pasolini’s Paul is structured around the idea of a ‘constant 
contemporaneity’, which takes the form of ‘a fictive contemporaneity’: 
according to Badiou, Pasolini ‘wanted to say: Paul is our fictional con-
temporary because the universal content of his preaching, obstacles and 
failures included, remains absolutely real’.18 Badiou chooses his words 
carefully here: what makes Paul our contemporary is not a series of fac-
tual or positive data, such as, for instance, a supposed analogy between 
our time and the Roman Empire or between Paul and a political figure 
that we would be in need of today. What is contemporary, still real, are 
his singularity (his being in excess over the law) and his universal 
address, ‘the universal content of his preaching’ (which proceeds from 
that excessiveness). But what such an action produces is a fictive con-
temporaneity: Paul is our contemporary, but in the mode of a ‘fiction’, 
of the fingere. In fact, he is our contemporary insofar as he is someone 
who produces, in the present, a supplement inconsistent with the pres-
ent, someone who produces an absolute singularity that makes a ‘hole’ 
in the present. Paul is contemporary because of his ability to be in each 
present, against the present.19 And, Badiou continues, starting from this 
‘making a hole in the present’, the contemporaneity of Paul takes the 
form of ‘the holy will to destruction’.20 What is contemporary to us is 
that which eludes both the symbolic order of Paul’s time and the sym-
bolic order of our present: what is contemporary is something which, as 
the Lacanian real, ‘pierces a hole’ in the knowledge organizing the pres-
ent, something which presents itself as an absolute singularity or anom-
aly by exposing a universal, and indeed eternal, trans-historical content. 
As Badiou reminds us, a subject is contemporary to its time in a ‘nega-
tive’, or rather ‘piercing’, way: a subject unfolds the consequences of a 
truth, and such ‘truth is not a qualification of knowledge nor an intu-
ition of the intelligible. One must come to conceive of truth as making a 
hole in knowledge. Lacan is paradigmatic on this point. The subject is 
thus convoked as a border-effect or a delimitating fragment of such a 
hole-piercing.’21 This is why Paul’s universalism can only take the form 
of a ‘will of destruction’: the truth exposed by the Pauline preaching, 
i.e. the gratuity of salvation, erodes from inside, by its mere appearing, 
the system of values upon which the hierarchization of society is orga-
nized. As Badiou puts it, ‘truth is diagonal relative to every communi-
tarian subset, it does not depend upon any given identity, nor does it 
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constitute any. It is offered to all, or addressed to anyone, without a 
condition of belonging being able to limit this offer, or this address.’22 
 What exactly is such a destructive aspect? Two features of Paul are 
commonly highlighted: the universalistic address of his preaching and 
his mimetic capacity. Universalism, as Badiou puts it, proceeds from the 
dogmatic core of Paul’s doctrine of free grace, specifically from the fact 
that the grace of overcoming death is for all, regardless of any positive 
distinction. Secondly, Paul’s preaching constantly displays a mimetic 
attitude: he strictly adapts to each situation, respecting every local law, 
and speaking in accordance with the specificity of his audience, as a Jew 
among Jews, a pagan among pagans. But at the same time, as Badiou 
notes, in his mimetism Paul ‘traverses all differences’:23 he merges with 
the specificities of the situation where he preaches, but behaves as if 
such differences were non-existent, so as to unveil through these differ-
ences the universal meaning of his message. In this sense, as we can read 
in the beginning of the first letter to the Corinthians, his mode of rela-
tion with a given situation appears to be what one can call a negative 
mimetism. Paul, in fact, manifests himself as ignorant among the 
Greeks, for whom knowledge is the most praised value; likewise, he 
manifests himself as a scandal among the Jews, the people of the law. 
But he also addresses the Romans, the administrators of justice in the 
empire, by stressing the idea of grace as a gift, in excess over justice and 
retribution.24 Free, disconnected from acts and thus incalculable, salva-
tion defies at once justice and knowledge: it does not deny them, but 
rather appears within them as a hole, an inconsistency which cannot be 
eliminated and which progressively expands – namely, via Paul’s preach-
ing. In an analogous fashion, Pasolini portrays Paul preaching amongst 
Marxists, who ‘ascoltano con simpatia i suoi discorsi, ma [sono; 
author’s note] assolutamente inamalgamabili a lui sul terreno della reli-
gione’.25
 In all these cases, Paul does not act against knowledge or against 
the law (as noted, he strongly insists on the necessity of always respect-
ing both the secular power and the Jewish law): in other words, he does 
not relate to a specific situation by positing a determinate negation – for 
instance, by entering in a dialectical conflict with institutions. Rather, 
what he does is to add an element that is specific to each situation but 
that functions as a hole which can only appear in the specific fabric of 
one situation: a divine word that appears as stupid within knowledge, a 
divine word that nullifies the law without negating it. ‘The righteous-
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ness of God has been manifested apart from law’, Paul claims: some-
thing is manifested, is undeniable, and yet is subtracted from the logic 
of the situation in which it appears.26 In his pastoral journeys, he drags 
this negative supplement from place to place, from institution to institu-
tion, undoing the fabric of each situation from within.27 Universalism is 
thus not constructed by negating particularities, but by adding to those 
particularities an element, always specific, which subtracts their evi-
dence and undoes their power: he introduces an empty supplement, an 
in-actual element, a nothing that consumes particularities. And, to put it 
in Paul’s words, ‘God chose […] things that are not, to reduce to noth-
ing things that are.’28
 This peculiar negation, which affirms the universal novelty without 
entering in a dialectical relation with the present, is what Badiou con-
siders the fundamental operation by way of which an event penetrates 
into the specificity of a situation. As he affirms in ‘Destruction, Nega-
tion, Subtraction’, a novelty ‘implies negation, but must affirm its iden-
tity apart from the negativity of negation’. It must thus perform an 
‘affirmative part of the negation’:29 universalism progressively destroys 
the particular order of a situation, its particularity, by affirming a spe-
cific point that is inconsistent with that particularity and that, appear-
ing within the situation, consumes its fabric, without entering in rela-
tion to it. 
 The extent of the consequences produced by introducing such an 
excessive element can be found – in an explicit, if multifarious, relation-
ship to Paul – in Pasolini’s Teorema. Pasolini’s Teorema book (published 
the same year he wrote the first version of Saint Paul) displays – in a 
peculiar style, which goes back and forth incessantly between essay, cin-
ema script, novel, notebook, and poetry – the arrival of a guest among a 
family belonging to the Italian industrial bourgeoisie.30 The reader is 
left ignorant of any specific aspect of this guest: we do not know the 
exact reason for his presence, the type of relationship he has with the 
family members, or his background. One by one all the members of the 
family fall under the spell of this guest, who is voided of all positive 
coordinates and who is properly excessive: he seems to be nothing but 
an excess of light or of beauty. 
 The text contains multiple references to Paul. Paul’s figure is some-
how fragmented and reflected in different characters. The guest incar-
nates a sort of Pauline figure – the figure of the one bearing an event, 
the one who by his presence fissures the consistency of the roles of all 
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the members of the family, thus progressively flattening out all differ-
ences.31 But one can also read the guest as a Christ-like figure, a name-
less event, whose heritage is then carried by the other charaters. The 
name of the paterfamilias is in fact Paolo, and his character is struc-
tured in terms of Pauline references: he is a rich bourgeois who is struck 
by an encounter, the first consequence of which is that he (exactly like 
Paul, who is struck by light on the way to Damascus) contracts a major 
problem with his vision.
 In this text one can discern a further consequence of the idea of a 
universalism that operates by subtractive means, i.e. of the idea of an 
event that addresses everyone, eroding the codes that assign different 
roles to each individual. In the script about Saint Paul, this subtractive 
universalism has two aspects: the fact that Paul’s preaching relies on a 
hole or an inconsistency (the appearance of something out of order, out 
of proportion, unprovable) and the fact that his action is characterized 
by a constant attempt to remove particularities. In Teorema, this logic 
seems to unfold a third, further aspect: the presence of a supplementary 
element, which, on the one hand, destroys the logic upon which a com-
munity is structured, the logic according to which each member occu-
pies a differentiated, stable position, but, on the other hand, creates a 
new community, founded exactly upon that absence of relation. In this 
sense, Pasolini writes:
l’amore che li accomuna per l’ospite non è qualcosa che li accomuna […] 
Tutti i membri della famiglia sono resi uguali fra loro dal loro amore 
se greto, dal loro appartenere all’ospite: non c’è più dunque differenza fra 
l’uno e l’altro […] ma, tutti insieme, non fanno certo una chiesa.32 
The presence of the stranger, of the extrainstitutional, the nameless or 
unaccountable term, produces the collapsing of a specific community 
(the bourgeois family). At the same time, the members of the family are 
reconstituted as a new koiné (a community in the broad sense of ‘hav-
ing or being in common’), but a koiné that has no substantive basis. In 
fact, by falling in love with the perfect stranger, the different members 
of the family break with the specific social roles organizing their mutual 
relations, and they maintain in common only the scandalous act by 
which they separate themselves from these roles. This change does not 
produce a new positive community, based on this or that exclusive fea-
ture (wealth, language, religion, and so on). The new community is no 
longer identified by any positive characteristic, but by the eccentric tra-
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jectory that each member undergoes in escaping his or her position in 
the family. Not only is that which is ‘common’ to them not anything 
substantive, but, moreover, this ‘common’ is a trajectory of the removal 
of qualities, of subtraction of respective differences – a trajectory by 
which they are finally ‘resi uguali’. This new ‘community’ is thus not a 
new ‘societal form’, but rather a simple ‘having in common’ that cannot 
turn into a new community, identifiable on the basis of given criteria, 
exactly because it has ‘nothing’ in common but the very act by which 
each individual removes her- or himself from the common structure that 
had assigned them different, specific places and roles.
2 .  T H E  P A R A D O X E S  O F  N E G A T I O N  A N D  T H E  P R O D U C T I O N  O F 
N O V E L T Y
The idea that an evental moment cannot simply lead to the constitution 
of a new, specific form of community is central in the above-mentioned 
article – ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction’ – in which Alain Badiou 
constructs his argument in terms of a commentary on Pasolini’s poem 
‘Vittoria’.33 The poem stages the desperation of the ghosts of dead com-
munist partisans, who perceive the impasse of the next generation, the 
generation after World War II. The problem – which is at stake both in 
this text and in Pasolini’s script about Paul – is the following: a novelty, 
a radical break ‘insists’ within the present but has no dialectical relation 
with it. This leads to a double-bind. Either the evental moment of frac-
ture continues in a purely destructive attitude (in this specific case, the 
partisan struggle of liberation could have continued after the war, end-
lessly refusing every political compromise), or the consequences of the 
event are progressively put in a dialectical relation with the present (in 
this specific case, the communist resistance entered, after the war, 
within the frame of the parliamentary dialectic). In the first case, the 
event as radical fracture is maintained, but no positive consequence is 
built out of it, and it perpetually consumes itself in a series of evanes-
cent, destructive acts. In the second case, a solid edifice of consequences 
is apparently built, but the idea of a radical interruption is lost through 
the very fact of accepting a common terrain of dialogue with the reac-
tionaries (who, after the war, are no longer the fascists but the agents of 
consumerist capitalism). On the one hand – this is Badiou summing up 
Pasolini – a pure action of destruction has as result ‘the impossibility of 
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politics, […] a sort of nihilistic collective suicide, which is without 
thinking and destination’, while, on the other, if we enter in the logic of 
dialectical opposition, we have ‘the death of negation’, which is ‘the 
death of political hope’.34
 In the complicated dialectic of the poem, those who are trapped in 
the second ‘dead end’ appear as the ‘fathers’: they are the partisans 
who, having survived the war, not only have reached an age at which 
they might be the fathers of the ones killed, but who in particular have 
become the fathers of the party and of the republican institutions. Each 
of these fathers is now an ‘eroe ormai diviso’, who ‘si rivolge alla 
ragione non ragione, alla sorella triste della ragione, che vuole capire la 
realtà nella realtà, con passione che rifiuta ogni estremismo, ogni temer-
ità’.35 On the other side, the dead partisans are described as sons – ret-
rospectively abandoned by the fathers – where ‘sons’ at once suggests 
the impulsive idealism of youth and their dependence on the fatherly 
figure of a revolutionary idea. In a dialectical twist or inversion, those 
who had no time to develop the consequences of the resistance – to be 
its faithful sons – somehow get frozen in the evanescent moment in 
which they rise up and, as ‘sons’ of the idea, perform it in reality, in an 
evental manner; on the other hand, those who developed the conse-
quences of the revolutionary moment in a diachronic way – and not 
simply as part of an evanescent revolutionary outburst – find themselves 
forced into the necessity of performing mediations. Their actions grow 
more and more distant from the non-dialectical dimension of the event: 
they appear to depend more and more upon the mediations operated by 
those who speak in the name of the event. In other words, these subjects 
take the place of the event; they become ‘fathers’ in its place. 
 The reason of the revolt is thus split: on the one hand, the coher-
ence of the sons, free from consequences; on the other, the construction 
of consequences, manipulated by these new fathers, who have lost all 
coherence. The fathers, are lost in a ‘ragione non ragione’, proclaim 
that ‘bisogna sacrificare la coerenza / all’incoerenza della vita, tentare 
un dialogo / creatore’; at the same time, Pasolini says about the sons, 
‘che ragione volete che ascolti questa ansiosa / masnada di uomini, che 
hanno lasciato – come dicono i canti – la casa, la sposa / la vita stessa, 
proprio nel nome della Ragione?’36 On the one hand, reason has lost 
contact with its own reason – the reason of the revolt – and it resolves 
into a sterile illusion, i.e., the illusion that dialogue, mediation, can cre-
ate a novelty (‘bisogna tentare un dialogo creatore’); on the other hand, 
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the reason of the revolt, refusing all reasonable mediation, ‘non ascolta 
ragione’, is unable to produce consequences: it dissolves into an evanes-
cent fracture.
 Badiou reads this poem starting exactly from this complicated and 
thwarted dialectic and aims at finding a solution for the double impasse 
to which the construction of novelty apparently leads. He writes: 
All creations, all novelties, are in some sense the affirmative part of a nega-
tion. ‘Negation’, because if something happens as new, it cannot be 
reduced to the objectivity of the situation where it happens. […] But ‘affir-
mation’, the affirmative part of the negation, because if a creation is reduc-
ible to a negation of the common laws of objectivity, it completely depends 
on them with respect to its identity. So the very essence of a novelty implies 
negation but must affirm its identity apart from the negativity of nega-
tion.37 
For Badiou, Pasolini’s poem is ‘a manifesto for true negation’;38 it is the 
tragic attempt to escape the two impasses and find a viable, ‘affirmative 
part of negation’.39 A true negation has to escape the dead end of the 
fathers, who are ultimately the fathers of the institution of the republi-
can state, in which they play the role of the opposition. 
The heart of ‘Opposition’ is ‘to substitute some rules for the violence of 
the real […] to substitute rules of history, or rules of economy, to the rup-
ture of the Event. And when you do that, you ‘share the rules of the strug-
gle’ with your enemy. And finally you become a ‘slave of your enemy’, a 
‘brother’ of your enemy. So opposition is in fact the death of negation. 
And it is the death of political hope.40 
The ‘fathers’ thus transform negation into a determinate negation, 
which ultimately affirms the present. But a true negation also has to 
escape the impasse of the pure revolutionary moment of the ‘sons’, 
which resolves negation into a destructive drive: ‘The army of dead 
young men was on the side of destruction, of hate. They existed on the 
hard side of negation’.41 Badiou concludes that, in order to escape both 
determinate and destructive negation, one needs to think negation pri-
marily in terms of subtraction: a rejection of mediation, a construction 
at a distance from that which is negated. In this sense, ‘the way of free-
dom is a subtractive one’. Destruction can only have an accessory role: 
‘to protect the subtraction itself, to defend the new kingdom of emanci-
patory politics, we cannot radically exclude all forms of violence’.42
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 What Badiou sees in Pasolini’s Saint Paul goes exactly in this direc-
tion: Paul, first of all, is the destructor who tries to subtract his action 
from the logic of the situation, refusing both determinate negation and 
evanescent outbursts. But, at the same time, Paul constantly oscillates 
between evanescence and the constitution of a new dialectic with the 
present. For Badiou, both this attempt and this oscillation constitute the 
very motor of Pasolini’s screenplay on Paul. As Badiou puts it, Pasolini’s 
‘script charts the trajectory of saintliness within an actuality’.43 The 
problem is that
the principal aspect in this trajectory gradually becomes that of betrayal, 
its wellspring being that what Paul creates (the Church, the Organisation, 
the Party) turns against his own inner saintliness’ […]. [F]or Pasolini, 
reflecting on communism through Paul, the Party is what, little by little, 
inverts saintliness into priesthood through the narrow requirements of mil-
itantism.44 
This trajectory appears almost as a tragic destiny: if we go back to the 
moment in the script when Paul states his subtractive strategy in the 
clearest way – thus proving that he is ‘irreducible’ to the logic of the 
Marxists – we see that, in order to face their ironic rejection, he reacts 
by claiming the necessity of a strict codification of acts and behaviours. 
In this part of the script, Pasolini reproduces the change of tone that 
takes place between the first and the second part of the First Letter to 
the Corinthians; by doing so, he shows us the very moment in which the 
revolution is transformed into a structured reformism. This finally pro-
duces nothing but the intensification of the negative reactions that he 
tries to mitigate, and in fact the Marxist intellectuals react as follows: ‘ti 
meravigli? Chi parla è uno che non concepisce nulla al di fuori del 
codice […] è un ex-fariseo, […] È soprattutto un grande organizza-
tore’.45 
 Throughout the last part of the script, this aspect becomes increas-
ingly important, to the point at which Paul declares: ‘dobbiamo difend-
ere questo futuro bene di tutti accettando, sì, anche di essere diplo-
matici, abili, ufficiali’.46 More precisely, the revolutionary impact of 
Christianity is defended not only by producing mediations, but also via 
the constitution of a structured organization of which the aim is to 
‘manage’ such mediations and compromises: ‘il nostro è un movimento 
organizzato… Partito, Chiesa, chiamalo come vuoi. Si sono stabilite 
delle istituzioni anche fra noi, che contro le istituzioni abbiamo lottato e 
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lottiamo’.47 By doing so, Paul becomes progressively aware, in the 
words of Pasolini himself, of the ineluctable necessity to ‘essere ipocriti. 
Fingere di non vedere le vecchie abitudini che risorgono in noi’.48 In the 
aftermath of the event, Paul, who is placed before the same double-bind 
as the partisans above, chooses the side of construction, but also of 
compromise, of dialectical relation with the present.49 He thus becomes 
‘non santo, ma prete’.50
 I suggest that Pasolini’s insistence on Paul’s illness, an aspect that is 
hardly stressed in the New Testament (which, on the contrary, focuses 
on his thaumaturgical healing capacity, which is totally absent in the 
script), should be read in this perspective. Progressively, with the 
unfolding of the text, Paul the healer gives way to Paul the sick man, 
consumed by the unavoidable contradictions of his action: the more the 
script proceeds, the deeper Paul gets involved in the contradiction 
between the universalist announcement and the construction of the 
Church and the more frequently and violently his sickness recurs. In this 
sense, Badiou reads Paul’s weakening in Pasolini’s script as the growing 
of an ‘internal darkening’,51 which culminates in his death. In fact, in 
Pasolini’s text sickness can neither be attributed solely to the moments 
of universalist predication, nor solely to the moments when Paul 
appears as a bureaucrat: sickness punctuates the whole text; it lingers 
somehow in between the two sides of Paul, as a symptom of this contra-
diction. Such a connection between the figure of Paul and the theme of 
sickness appears also in Teorema: as Paolo, the bourgeois paterfamilias, 
enters into an amorous relation with the nameless guest – an amorous 
relation with the duration of an evanescent event – he is struck by a 
temporary blindness, which, similarly to Saint Paul’s, comes with an 
extreme weakness. Paolo appears to be hypersensitive to an excessive 
brightness pervading the house, a light about which Pasolini says that it 
has a ‘compito senza rapporto con le cose del mondo’.52 The light inter-
venes as a caesura, it ‘enlightens’ Paolo, and at the same time it sus-
pends his normal, current ‘rapporto con le cose del mondo’. Just as in 
the script on Paul, so too sickness is identified here with a state of lin-
gering or of suspension, with an unresolved contradiction. This contra-
diction is exposed by the evental encounter, but it is not resolved or 
closed. Even earlier than these two texts, the relation between the figure 
of Paul, sickness, and a state of suspension between contradictory terms 
is also present in a letter of Pasolini’s of 1964. In the letter Pasolini 
declares himself stuck: 
 
 223B A D I O U ’ S  P A S O L I N I
sono bloccato, caro Don Giovanni, in un modo che solo la Grazia 
potrebbe sciogliere. La mia volontà e l’altrui sono impotenti. … Forse per-
chè io sono da sempre caduto da cavallo … e un mio piede è rimasto impi-
gliato nella staffa, così che la mia corsa non è una cavalcata, ma un essere 
trascinato via, con il capo che sbatte sulla polvere e sulle pietre. Non posso 
né risalire sul cavallo degli Ebrei e dei Gentili, né cascare per sempre sulla 
terra di Dio.53
In each of these three examples, the sickness has a slightly different role. 
If in Teorema Paolo’s sickness is caused by the unbearable presence of 
an event which exposes his contradictions, in the script on Saint Paul 
the sickness is caused by the contradictions embedded in the necessity of 
developing the consequences of such an event. Finally, the Paul of the 
letter to Don Giovanni is mired in a further complication, as he can nei-
ther exclude himself from the Pauline contradictions nor fully embrace 
them. At his closest to the contradictions of militancy, to the contradic-
tions of the church, to the contradictions between the necessity of a rad-
ical change and the organization of such a change, Pasolini does not 
even fall from the horse; he does not even land on the soil on which 
Paul receives God’s light: Pasolini remains in the powerless position of 
the intellectual, not stuck in the contradictions of the event but a step 
removed from them. Perhaps, after the failure of the ‘fictional return’ of 
Paul in the historical situation of the war and post-war period, it 
becomes clear that a bourgeois intellectual (as Pasolini is) is unable to 
embrace, and to try to solve, the contradictions emanating from an 
event. 
 The conflict between an event and its consequences is not only 
incarnated by the (multifaceted) figure of Paul. In Pasolini’s script these 
contradictions are also transferred onto the figure of the disciple. The 
disciple is the central figure of every revolution: it is via a disciple that a 
revolution spreads and becomes more than an individual episode; at the 
same time, the organization of disciples requires discipline, structure, 
law. Timothy, Paul’s beloved disciple, is a silent but crucial figure in 
Pasolini’s script: half Jewish, half pagan, he appears to incarnate the 
image of the generic humanity to come, a humanity between worlds, 
similar to Pasolini’s ‘borgatari’ – stretched between an ancient world 
and capitalist society – of whom he is, I think, an echo. At the same 
time it should be remarked that, of all the epistles, it is the Letters to 
Timothy in which Paul insists most on the church as institution, on the 
new law, on internal hierarchies.54 Not only are the two letters struc-
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tured as a list of obligations and prohibitions, but they are an attempt 
to classify Christians using specific, positive, distinctive characteristics: 
which type of man is fit to become a bishop, which one a deacon, and 
so on.55 On top of this, the letters to Timothy produce a narrowing, a 
closure of the church. A shift of focus from external to internal enemies 
can be read in them: the central polemic is the one against fake doctors 
and fake preachers,56 and it culminates, in the letter to Titus, in the will 
to silence insubordinate Christians.57 In Paul’s address to his beloved 
disciple, we witness the progressive transformation of universality into 
particularism, of the freedom of grace into the necessity of a new law – 
even as the law was precisely what universalism was supposed to over-
come. 
 Consistently with this, in Pasolini’s script Timothy performs a com-
plete parable, which leads him from being the bearer of the most 
generic humanity to being the incarnation of the most hierarchized, 
bureaucratic structure. The end of the script shows Timothy (who has 
become a bishop) reading the foregoing letter. ‘Il Vescovo è Timoteo’ is 
the brutal incipit of scene 105, depicting him with all the attributes of 
distinction: ‘vestito dei vestiti prelatizi e lo zucchetto cremisi, egli è 
seduto alla sua scrivania, potente, lussuosa, neoclassica. […] Anch’egli è 
un po’ di cera, come i Cristi, gli Angeli, i Santi barocchi o neoclassici 
fissati sulle pareti e sulle volte della sua ricca casa’.58 ‘Distinto’ is here 
not only a synonym for ‘rich’ or ‘of higher rank’, but also means ‘bearer 
of distinction’, i.e., a bearer of the opposite of that drive towards indif-
ferentiation which is at the core of Paul’s universalism. 
3 .  F R E E D O M ,  N E C E S S I T Y  A N D  T H E  C O N T R A D I C T I O N S  O F 
O R G A N I Z A T I O N
The result of all the inner contradictions of the universalistic project is – 
as Badiou puts it – that Paul’s trajectory develops an ‘almost necessary 
movement of an internal betrayal’, the result of which is that ‘Paul also 
dies to the extent that saintliness has darkened within him’.59 This inter-
nal betrayal – the reconstitution of a positive realm of the law – is here 
described as a necessity, leading to death. The more reactions Paul has 
to face in opposition to the universalistic project, the more his subtrac-
tive universalism turns into its opposite: a hierarchized machine able to 
respond to any specific situation, by means of organization, classifi-
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cation, exclusion. Paul’s necessary betrayal is structured around two 
axes: on the one hand, his actions become more and more structured 
according to the specificities of the situations to which he has to 
respond; on the other, in order to do so, he has to focus on the con-
struction of a social machinery able to fulfil the complicated tasks of 
mediation (as opposed to the ‘simplicity’ of subtraction). In the last 
pages of the script we see him in a ‘solenne chiesa, barocca o neoclas-
sica che sia, piena di tutta la sua terribile e idiota, sfarzosa e deprimente 
violenza controriformistica’: a church in which ‘risuona l’ammonimento 
precettistico di Paolo’,60 a series of positive prescriptions of specific 
behaviours concerning this or that type of person, which goes on for 
two entire scenes.61 But such behaviour is an untenable contradiction, 
for the Paul of grace, and in these last pages of the script, death is in 
fact at the door. 
 Universalism has thus turned into law, into specification. But fur-
thermore: via the means of universalism, particularization is extended 
to all humanity. As Pasolini was later to write, regarding another pope: 
‘sono ridivenuto un Ebreo: / un Ebreo, si capisce restato fedele alla 
Legge. / Sono dunque codificato Capo / del Ghetto dove sta tutta 
l’Umanità, / in quanto tutta esclusa rispetto a Dio’.62 Thus redefined in 
a universal particularism, humanity is once again bound to the law and 
inevitably assigned to death. Both (in a literal sense) for Paul, and (in a 
metaphorical one) for humanity, the reinstitution of law coincides with 
exclusion from the gratuity of grace and therefore with the triumph of 
death. As Paul writes at the end of First Corinthians: ‘the sting of death 
is sin, and the power of sin is the law’.63 
 In this perspective, this passage can be read as follows: what the 
free grace of Christ destroys is the necessity of eternal death (everyone, 
given original sin, receives retribution – by an automatism that has the 
force of a proper law – in the form of eternal death, although according 
to the law of Moses some can be saved by their acts, thereby following, 
once again, a law of just retribution). The freedom given to each indi-
vidual by Christ is not only the opposite of law: as freedom, it is first 
and foremost the opposite of necessity. But this freedom necessitates a 
structure, an organization, in order to be activated and spread through-
out the world, and this is precisely, as has been seen, the task that Paul 
is called upon to fulfil. This is the point of internal fracture: in order for 
everyone to be free, freedom has necessarily to turn into a necessity, a 
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structured law. And what is the opposite of freedom (what is ‘neces-
sity’), if not that which condemns us, if not the devil? 
 This is why in Pasolini’s text the devil is identified with the very fig-
ure that orchestrates the constitution of the Church, actively working to 
structure Christianity as a Church endowed with a system of laws. 
Indeed the script itself is punctuated by the figure of Luke, who con-
spires to establish a new law: in one of his last appearances, Luke has a 
dialogue with the devil, of which Pasolini writes ‘lungo dialogo fra i 
due: Luca riassume ghignando al suo capo la continuazione della storia 
di Paolo. Praticamente ormai il fine è raggiunto. La Chiesa è fondata. Il 
resto non è che una lunga appendice, un’agonia’.64 
 The work of the devil, orchestrated by Luke, seems to be strictly 
connected with the function of writing. If the devil works through Luke, 
it is because he is the one who, as we know, stabilizes Paul’s actions and 
words by putting them in the written form of the Acts of the Apostles. 
As Badiou notes, ‘the Acts […] present us with the saint erased by the 
priest’.65 The problem is that, on the contrary, Luke insists throughout 
the Acts on the effectiveness of communal aspects, focusing on commu-
nal life and the abolition of property. I therefore suggest that Pasolini’s 
insistence on the relation between Luke and the devil should be seen not 
at the level of content, but rather at the level of form – namely at the 
level of his will to systematization and  to (written) codification. The 
kernel of the Pasolinian figure of Luke, I suggest, consists in the fact 
that, by way of the very act of writing, he produces something that is of 
the order of fixation.66 What is at stake in the very process of codifica-
tion – which is doubtlessly one of the strongest instruments in the his-
tory of evangelization – is the transformation of the tools of freedom 
into a set of necessary forms, into a normative instrument: and there is 
no evil other than the growth of necessity inside the freedom of grace.67 
There is no solution to this: in fact, freedom is such only if it is without 
distinction, if it is a free grace for all. But such a for-all institutes, de 
facto, a necessity. And necessity is structure, order, law, and ultimately 
division between the church and its exteriority. Necessity, the work of 
the devil, appears as the internal betrayal of the universalistic project. 
Again, it is here that ‘the goal of the devil is reached, the Church is 
founded’. Universality has turned into diabolé, into division.68 
 There is thus a double dialectic structuring the contradictions 
around which Pasolini’s script on Saint Paul is built. On the one hand, 
there is a universalistic project, which has no substantive ground and is 
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not the infinite expansion of a koiné but is instead founded on a radical 
fracture or disconnection, on the introduction of an empty supplement 
that breaks down the validity of given differences. On the other hand – 
as the mirroring opposite of this disconnective universalism – there is 
the fact that the construction of a structured community is that which 
produces new divisions: the division between the church and its exteri-
ority and, even more, the division between all the different elements of 
the church, differently classified and hierarchized according to their spe-
cific features. The universalistic project is thus founded on disconnec-
tion, while the constitution of a new community produces new divi-
sions. The problem, as we now know, is that the second dialectic is the 
necessity embedded in the freedom of the first. 
 One can thus wonder if the tragic end of the other Paul, the Paolo 
of Teorema, is caused by the attempt to solve this internal necessity of 
failure. Paolo, who initiates the disaggregational process that his bour-
geois family undergoes, not only does not try to reconstruct a koiné 
starting from the evental appearance of the stranger, but also proceeds 
without compromise towards a process of self-destruction. Instead of 
dying progressively, like Saint Paul, from an internal darkening that is 
the consequence of these contradictions, Paul prefers to destroy himself 
so to leave room for the new to appear. In the last part of the book, 
Paolo gives his factory to the workers, to which the workers react by 
arguing that a gift obligates them in the manner of a debt and connects 
them with the bourgeoisie – which wouldn’t have been the case if the 
factory had been obtained by means of political struggle.69 The problem 
is that, through the donation, ‘la mutazione dell’uomo in piccolo bor-
ghese sarebbe totale’.70 But at the end Paolo eliminates himself, in a 
final ekpurosis that aims to create a new radical fracture. If the gift of 
the factory is a consequence of the first fracture (the one initiated with 
the arrival of the stranger), then this second fracture (Paul’s self-destruc-
tion) aims at eliminating the contradictions necessarily generated by the 
consequences of the first. For Paolo, finally ‘the only good bourgeois is 
a dead bourgeois’, because only by his own death can he interrupt the 
process that progressively transforms the consequences of an event into 
a new mode of unequal organization of the present.
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C O N C L U S I O N :  A  P R E S E N T  S U S P E N D E D  B E T W E E N  T W O 
E V E N T S
The contradictions of change (the subtractive form of universalism; the 
necessity of organizing universalism, which produces new divisions; the 
impossible choice between the evanescence of the event and the con-
struction of consequences which turn the event into its opposite) consti-
tute for Pasolini, as he states in ‘Vittoria’, the ‘antinomie simmetriche 
che io tengo in pugno come vecchie abitudini’,71 something that forms 
the very kernel of his writing activity and which he therefore holds as he 
holds his pen, but which at the same time – like the Paolo of Teorema 
and like himself in the letter to don Giovanni – he cannot properly 
manipulate.
 It is by way of these contradictions that Pasolini (or at least the 
axis of perspective constituted by Badiou, Pasolini, and Paul) thinks the 
emergence of change, the apparition – within and against the present – 
of something which, disconnected from the historical dimension of the 
present, intervenes in it as a disconnective force. In Pasolini, I suggest, 
such an ‘inactual force’ is always double, always dividing itself: both an 
evental manifestation, inscribing itself in the present, at once through 
non-dialectical means and through forms of compromise, and the return 
of a transhistorical ‘forza del passato’ – a past which, like the event, has 
no substantive materiality. Such a past cannot be identified with a previ-
ous historical time or with a primordial era: it is rather a ‘force’ that 
appears, as Pasolini tells us, ‘più moderno di ogni moderno’.72 This is, I 
think, the ‘other’ of Europe – that which appears each time as a radical 
fracture and as a new foundation (Paul from Damascus, Medea from 
Colchis, a new Orestes from sub-Saharan Africa). When such a ‘forza 
del passato’ appears, in order to overcome its merely subtractive or 
destructive moment, it needs to produce a new historical beginning, and 
in the sequence obened by this foundation, the historical determinations, 
that this change was meant to overcome and destroy are reproduced. 
This is why each revolution needs to fight against the very form of its 
necessary historical inscription. And at any given moment, only the fur-
ther, completely different reappearance of a ‘forza del passato’ can wipe 
away the necessary compromises produced by a previous event. 
 Each revolutionary process thus necessarily stands in between two 
events (as we have also seen in the case of Teorema): and this in-
betweenness constitutes what I would call ‘Paul’s limbo’. Pasolini’s Paul 
 
 229B A D I O U ’ S  P A S O L I N I
is properly trapped in a logical limbo: he is caught between the event of 
a freedom that is evanescent and bears a universal address, and the logi-
cal necessity that comes with the ‘for all’ of the universal address of this 
same freedom – that is, a ‘universal freedom’ that can realize itself only 
through its transformation into necessity, into law, but also into division 
and particularization. As Pasolini’s Paul says: our situation ‘è un limbo 
[…] Noi non siamo la redenzione, ma una promessa di redenzione. Noi 
stiamo fondando la Chiesa’.73 Trapped in this limbo, the revolutionary 
subject can survive only by believing in the idea that the revolution, 
internally doomed to failure, will be indefinitely restarted. This, I sug-
gest, is why the theme of the parousia, of the second coming, is so cen-
tral in Paul. As Badiou says in other texts, a revolutionary subject is 
never only the subject of one event, but is always in between two 
events. Literally speaking, there is no event without a second one that 
re-activates the first. Somehow, ‘there will have been’ an event only 
when a second one re-activates it. In this sense, Badiou claims that ‘for 
there to be an event, one must be able to situate oneself within the con-
sequences of another’.74 With evident resonance with Paul’s theme of 
the second coming, Badiou calls this ‘resurrection’. As Badiou puts it, 
an event has infinite consequences and a universal address, but its con-
crete realization in a sequence is necessarily finite (given the necessary 
internal contradictions leading to its darkening). Therefore, for an event 
to be an event, it must necessarily be reactivated by another one, which 
means that the existence of an evental sequence is only possible from 
the standpoint of a current, open sequence.75 Spartacus exists only 
through Müntzer, and the Commune only through the October Revolu-
tion, but one might also suggest that there will have been Aeschylus’ 
Oresteia only if it comes to be reactivated in Africa.
 In Paul’s case, this logic implies that the work of the devil – the 
constitution of the Church, the creation of laws and rules of exclusion, 
the identification of internal enemies – forms a sort of new dialectical 
engine, which, on the one side, extinguishes the previous event, but 
which, on the other, accelerates the next event to come. Paul himself is 
aware of this: as he writes in the Second Letter to the Thessalonians, the 
construction of the Church will produce fractures, reactions, and perse-
cutions, and this increasing evil is what will accelerate the second com-
ing.76 In political terms, the organization of a revolution (its darkening) 
extinguishes universalism by producing new fractures and contradic-
tions, but this harshening of contradictions is also what might acceler-
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ate a new revolutionary process, a new event. It is probably also for this 
reason that Pasolini insists on the fact that ‘le istituzioni sono commo-
venti, / e commoventi perchè ci sono: perchè / l’umanità – essa, la 
povera umanità – non può farne a meno’.77 If the necessity of institu-
tions (by which the event escapes its own evanescence) is that in which 
the freedom of grace – but also the infinite return of a certain ‘force’ – is 
extinguished, this necessity has at the same time a certain ‘grace’: insti-
tutions are ‘touching’, as if they were somehow ‘touched’ by grace. In 
their perversion, they are that which allows, and even accelerates, the 
possibility of a second coming, or of a further revolutionary moment 
driven against them.78
 Thus, universalism might fade, but the contradictions resulting 
from this darkening might lead to another revolution – always to come. 
In Pasolinian terms, the consequences of the Resistance might fade into 
the multiform and pervasive softness of immaterial capitalism, but this 
is also what produces the possibility for the arrival of an ‘Alì dagli occhi 
azzurri’, with whom no mediation will be possible. It is here that we see 
the point of convergence of the religious theme of the second coming, 
the revolutionary theme of a change that has no dialectic relation with 
the present, and the theme of the return of a mythical ‘forza del pas-
sato’. These three sides of change undergo a specific and twisted logic: a 
logic in which the freedom of a new, radical change collapses because of 
the necessity of creating consistent means of realization, and in which 
the disaster of novelty is also its own promise. It is here that Pasolini, 
caught in the line uniting Paul and Badiou, interrogates our present, 
cutting the present at the very point where the eternal, the ‘ancient’, or 
the ‘inactual’ – which is nothing else than the very force of radical 
change – reappears again and again. 
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3 Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. by Ray Bras-
sier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).
4 Badiou uses the expression ‘universal address’ (‘adresse universelle’ in French) 
throughout Saint Paul. 
5 See Badiou, Saint Paul, ch. 2 (‘Who is Paul?’), and his Being and Event (London: 
Continuum, 2006), meditations 16, 17 and 23.
6 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 45.
7 Ibid., p. 49.
8 Ibid., p. 76 (see also, in more abstract terms, p. 81).
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., pp. 76–77.
11 Rom. 3, 28 (Revised Standard Version). The Revised Standard Version, in com-
parison to the Authorized and the New Revised Standard Versions, often 
appears to be closer to the translations used by Pasolini and Badiou. Therefore 
we refer here to the Revised Standard Version unless otherwise indicated.
12 In one of his earliest texts, Badiou notes that ‘the theological contents of Thomas 
Müntzer’s preaching constitutes a frame for the aspiration of the plebeian class’; 
namely they serve the idea of a complete equality, the kernel of which is the ‘sup-
pression of all institutions’. Alain Badiou and François Balmès, De l’idéologie 
(Paris: Maspéro, 1976), pp. 27 and 57. My translation.
13 Rom. 4, 2ff. 
14 Of course one can argue that a substantial division of humanity still exists, 
namely that between those who have faith and those who do not. That said, 
faith does not automatically imply grace, but it is faith in the fact that grace can 
touch anyone gratuitously, regardless of given differences or particularities. Any-
one can be touched by grace, and anyone can bear faith. The relation between 
faith and grace remains in this context problematic: in fact, if faith is a product 
of will, nonetheless it cannot force grace, which remains free and can potentially 
touch anyone; on the contrary, if faith is not a product of will, but a symptom of 
grace, then such faith can be given to anyone regardless of his/her differences. 
Both options confirm the point relevant to Badiou’s reading, namely that grace 
does not rely on any substantive, positive character and is not a compensation 
for specific acts.
15 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 77.
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16 For a synthetic overview on the concept of the subject in Alain Badiou’s thought, 
see Bruno Besana, ‘Subject’, in Alain Badiou: Key Concepts, ed. by A. J. Bartlett 
and Justin Clemens (Durham: Acumen, 2010), pp. 38–47.
17 Alain Badiou, ‘On a Finally Objectless Subject’, trans. by Bruce Fink, in Who 
Comes after the Subject?, ed. by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc 
Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 24–32 (p. 27). 
18 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 37. 
19 In the text published as the introduction to the script (Progetto per un film su 
san Paolo), Pasolini stresses at once his ‘convizione della sua [Paul’s] attualità’, 
and the fact that Paul speaks with a language that is ‘universale ed eterno, ma 
inattuale (in senso stretto)’. Pier Paolo Pasolini, Progetto per un film su san 
Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, pp. 2023 and 2025. Paul is at once contemporary to 
his own time, and stricto sensu inactual, i.e. in-the-actual, but against it. That 
which, precisely, is inactual, is the universal content of his preaching. Luca Di 
Blasi’s article ‘One Divided by Another’ for this volume alerted me to the second 
quotation.
20 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 37.
21 Badiou, ‘Of a Finally Objectless Subject’, p. 25.
22 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 14, translation modified.
23 Ibid., p. 102; see all of ch. 10 more generally.
24 Rom. 4, 1ff.
25 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Appunti per un film su san Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, 
p. 1949. In order to stress the ‘inamalgabilità’, the radical difference, of his doc-
trinal content from any present form of discourse, Pasolini’s Paul here pro-
nounces the well-known passages from the beginning of First Corinthians, where 
Paul describes the content of his own preaching as ‘a stumbling block to Jews 
and folly to Gentiles’ (i Cor. 1, 24). Following the Italian edition, Pasolini in San 
Paolo quotes the phrase ‘scandalo per i Giudei, stoltezza per i Gentili’ (p. 88). In 
the pages following this passage Pasolini quotes further from i Cor. 2 and 3.
26 Paul, Romans 3, 21 (my italics). ‘Apart’ has to be understood in a strong sense 
as ‘with no relation’. The Authorized Version translates ‘without the law’, the 
New Revised Standard Version ‘irrespective of law’.
27 This attitude is the one that drives him from Corinth to Rome, through the dif-
ferent stages of his trial. At each level of judgement, Paul shows extreme respect 
for the institution, and thus makes clear that what he stands accused of needs to 
be judged on a further, superior level. By doing so, at each step of judgement he 
manages to evade the possibility of its being decided whether his acts are legal or 
illegal. This attitude ends up consuming the legal power, which appears to be 
powerless or at least aphasic.
28 i Cor. 1, 27–28 (New Revised Standard Version); the Revised Version reads 
‘bring’.
29 Alain Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction – On Pier Paolo Pasolini’, in 
this volume.
30 Pasolini published Teorema in 1968, and he worked on the Saint Paul project in 
two periods, in 1968 and in 1974.
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31 The arrival of the guest in the household creates a setting in which each member 
of the house undergoes a triple elimination of differences: first, each falls in love 
with the guest according to a fairly repetitive pattern; second, each progressively 
abandons her or his role in the structure of the family; and, finally, although 
each reacts absolutely differently when faced with the stranger, a closer look 
shows all these these differences to be flattened out: the daughter sinks into a 
state of catatonia, the mother embarks on a sort of sexual overdose, which has a 
kind of anaesthetic or catatonic effect, the son dives into a pure repetition of 
artistic stupidity, the father abandons everything, and the servant shuts herself 
off in a mystic stillness and ends up being buried alive. Each of them proceeds 
towards a progressive subtraction of the given differences that had fixed their 
societal roles – although, of course, the result of such a subtractive attitude is not 
the same in each case. 
32 Pasolini, Teorema, in Romanzi e Racconti, ed. by Walter Siti and Silvia De 
Laude, 2 vols (Milan: Mondadori 1998), i, p. 966.
33 Pier Paolo Pasolini, ‘Vittoria’, in Poesie in forma di rosa, in Tutte le Poesie, i, 
pp. 1259–70.
34 Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction’.
35 Pasolini, ‘Vittoria’, in Tutte le Poesie, i, p. 1267.
36 Ibid., pp. 1267–68.
37 Alain Badiou, ‘Destruction, Negation, Subtraction’.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 37. 
44 Ibid., p. 38.
45 Pier Paolo Pasolini, Appunti per un film su san Paolo, in Per il cinema, i, 
pp. 1953–54.
46 Ibid., p. 1974.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid. 
49 The theme of such a split is a recurrent one. We see it not only in ‘Vitto-
ria’(1964) and in the script on Paul (1968); in Teorema (of the same year) we 
find that Paolo, the pater familias, facing the impossibility of reforming the 
bourgeois family, drives the narrative towards a destructive end that alone can 
erase such the contradiction between radical change and reform. Finally, in 1971 
Pasolini again describes such contradiction in ‘L’enigma di Pio XII’, in which he 
affirms: ‘Paolo è nella mia coscienza un prete (come me)’. By means of all these 
examples, the role of the Communist party in the post-war political situation 
and the mode of constitution of the Christian ecclesia appear to converge in 
Pasolini’s very name, as a subjective bearer of such contradictions. Pier Paolo 
Pasolini, ‘L’emigma di Pio XII’, in Trasumanar e organizzar, in Pier Paolo Paso-
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lini, Tutte le poesie, ii, p. 17. Many thanks to Robert Gordon for drawing this 
text to my attention.
50 Pasolini, Per il cinema, i, p. 1988.
51 See Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 38.
52 Pasolini, Teorema, in Per il cinema, i, p. 936.
53 Pasolini, letter to Don Giovanni Sossi, 27 Decembre 1964, in Lettere, 1955–
1975, ed. by Nico Naldini (Turin: Einaudi, 1988), p. 576. I would like to thank 
H. Joubert Laurencin for drawing my attention to this text.
54 It should of course be considered that the attribution of the Letters to Timothy 
and Titus is controversial and that the majority of scholars tend to think they 
were written by a disciple of Paul, who had to face increasingly complex prob-
lems concerning the internal organization of the Church. This, I think, confirms 
the very ambivalent role of the disciples, highlighted in Pasolini’s script. 
55 And it even goes so far as to show how to deal with different widows in accord-
ance with their factual characteristics. Compare i Tim. 5, 3–16.
56 i Tim. 1; 4; and 6 and ii Tim. 2.
57 Titus 1, 10. Also striking in this regard is the example of the slaves: not only 
does the Christian slave have to respect the pagan master, so that no one will say 
anything bad of Christians, but she or he also has to respect the Christian mas-
ter, because the latter, being a Christian, will be a good master (i Tim. 6, 2).
58 Pasolini, Appunti per un film su san Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, p. 2013.
59 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 39; my italics.
60 Pasolini, Appunti per un film su san Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, pp. 2014–15.
61 Ibid., scenes 107 and 108, pp. 2014–17.
62 Pier Paolo Pasolini, ‘L’enigma di Pio XII’, p. 19. It should of course also be noted 
that Pio XII appears in the poem as the one whose name is inseparable from a 
criminal silence regarding the deportation and extermination of millions of Jews.
63 i Cor. 15, 56 (my italics).
64 Pasolini, Appunti per un film su san Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, p. 2000.
65 Badiou, Saint Paul, p. 39.
66 In his article for this volume, Luca Di Blasi also correctly points out that this 
identification of Luke with the ‘diabolic’ act of writing has to be understood 
from the perspective of the ‘Paulinian distinction between the letter and the 
spirit’.
67 Di Blasi points that this is, for Pasolini, ultimately a senseless necessity, as 
opposed to Badiou’s political necessity of constructing the organized conse-
quences of the event. In fact, such necessity, in Badiou’s perspective, has the form 
of an ethical obligation (it is necessary to subtract the event from its own evanes-
cence, by constructing its consequences); however, one should also consider that 
this same ethical obligation forces one to proceed to construct an organized 
structure, which necessarily (and here we again come across a ‘senseless’ neces-
sity, or a doom) produces a‘darkening’ – that is, the bureaucratic or institutional 
decay of the event.
68 The idea of a ‘diabolic ecclesia’, of a gathering (ecclesia) that divides into differ-
ences (diaballō), is of course a semi-invented etymology. In fact, the word ‘devil’ 
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comes from the verb diaballō and among the various meanings of the verb, that 
with the strictest relation with the devil is ‘to defame someone’. Notwithstand-
ing, one should bear in mind that ballō means ‘to throw’ or ‘to put’, and dia has 
as its primary meaning ‘separation’ (as it has the same origin as ‘duo’). Calumni-
ation or defamation is something that is thrown in the way of someone, and the 
devil is then the one who (also by the use of calumniation) ‘throws separations’, 
i.e., produces divisions. This is strongly present at the core of the linguistic ele-
ments composing its etymology.
69 Pasolini, Teorema, in Per il cinema, ii, ch. 17 and 18 of the second part, 
pp. 1045–52.
70 Ibid., p. 1051.
71 Pasolini, ‘Vittoria’, in Tutte le Poesie, i, p. 1266.
72 Pier Paolo Pasolini, ‘Poesie mondane’, in Tutte le poesie, i, p. 1099.
73 Pier Paolo Pasolini, San Paolo, in Per il cinema, ii, p. 1974. Interestingly enough, 
Pasolini is here talking about opposition: ‘l’opposizione è un limbo’, wherein one 
is trapped in the double-bind of determinate negation and destructive outburst.
74 Badiou, Being and Event, p. 210.
75 For Badiou, the ‘resurrection’ is ‘a fragment of truth inserted under the bar by 
the machinery’ of a reactionary process, of a process of ‘obscuration’ of a truth, 
– a fragment which ‘can be extracted from it at any instant’ (Logics of Worlds 
(London: Continuum, 2009), p. 63). Concerning the activation of such a frag-
ment, Badiou declares: ‘we will call this destination, which reactivates a subject 
in another logic […], resurrection’ (ibid., p. 65). This figure is thus nothing but 
the one of the event itself, of the sudden appearance of something radically ‘out 
of place and time’ in a situation that is completely normalized, stable, obscured. 
An event is thus always a second event, given that, if there was a first one, it 
would not have existed, as event, until reactivated by a second one.
76 In this sense, as one reads through Paul’s letters, one can discern a progressive 
harshening: if, on the one hand, this is a darkening of the process, on the other, it 
is the acceleration of a new one.
77 Pier Paolo Pasolini, ‘L’enigma di Pio XII’, p. 20. See the end of the poem as well, 
p. 25.
78 Of course there is a fundamental difference that cannot be underestimated: 
although there is a common structure between the second coming and the idea of 
the ‘resurrection’ or ‘reactivation’, the second coming is definitive, while a revo-
lutionary event is such only if it is indefinitely reactivated, resurrected. One 
should nonetheless also consider that the second coming has been interpreted 
(namely by Giorgio Agamben) along the line of a messianism that is realized in 
the waiting itself, and that is thus always ‘in between’. In this sense the Pauline 
second coming and the Badiousian time of the subject, stretched between two 
events, share a similar logic, as they both are times ‘in between’, and somehow 
thinkable only in retroactive terms (the Christian considers the first event, the 
resurrection, from the perspective of the end of the world, and the Badiousian 
revolutionarry subject considers the first event from the perspective of its possi-
ble reactivation via future events to come). In his ‘The Split and its Split’ for the 
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Pasolini-Conference ‘Beyond Europe’ (31 March–2 April 2011 at the Villa 
Vigoni), Luca Di Blasi devoted the second part of his talk to a comparative anal-
ysis of Pasolini’s split figure of Paul and Agamben’s interpretation of the messi-
anic time that resides at the core of Paul’s preaching: namely, he insisted on the 
fact that messianic time identifies the present as a split time, a time which is split 
or suspended between an ‘already’ and a ‘not yet’. Starting from the considera-
tions raised in Di Blasi’s talk, one should also acknowledge that the time 
between events, the time of parousia, is the same time as the historical one, but 
considered from the standpoint of another ‘clock’ or rhythm. The time alongside 
time, the time of the par-ousia, said Di Blasi, following Agamben, is the time of 
the ‘as if’; I think that such a time has a strong structural resemblance with that 
which I above called, following both Pasolini and Badiou, an inactual time, a 
time in-the-actuality, but acting against the actual present.
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